Iran is bracing itself for more days of tension, rallies and protests, which will very likely reach their climax on February 11th, the 31st anniversary of the Islamic Revolution.

The rallies in coming days will mark another yet not decisive moment in the long confrontation between the opposition led by figures such as Moussavi and Karroubi, and Ahmadinejad’s government supported the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. This confrontation has been defined by many analysts as “a marathon rather than a sprint”.

Various episodes in recent days foreshadow that there will be a new power struggle to measure up forces on the field. The hanging of two dissidents followed by the threatening statements of Ayatollah Jannati, and Ayatollah Yazdi before him, have been interpreted by many as the regime’s attempt to intimidate the opposition on the eve of a such an important celebration for the Islamic Republic.

Moussavi and Karroubi have shown that they are far from being intimidated and their immediate response is proof, on the one hand, that no compromise is in sight at the moment and, on the other, that the opposition has no intention to renounce its demands.

January was a relatively calm month following the huge protests and violent clashes on December 27th on the occasion of the Day of Ashura, one of the most important Shiite festivities. Analysts have been pondering what the future of the Green Movement can be and where the internal crisis being experienced by Iran in recent months will lead.

Many commentators have likened today’s events to those of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 showing the similarities and differences. This analysis has underscored, in particular, two factors, which, more than any other, make the two protest movements – 1979’s and today’s – incomparable: the Green Movement, unlike the one born under the charismatic leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, lacks a true leader and clear objectives hitherto.

Moussavi and Karroubi are two figures belonging both to the Islamic Republic’s establishment and they have both held important political positions (Moussavi was Prime Minister, Karroubi was Chairman of the Parliament). They wish to reform the system, not topple it. Both are the key figures of the movement, which, however, has many currents and even a certain degree of autonomy towards its very leaders.

Among its number, there are those who simply want Ahmadinejad removed from power because he is held guilty for having rigged the presidential election; there are those who wish to reform the system of the Islamic Republic making it more democratic and respectful of human rights; finally, there are those who want an all-out change of regime and intend to topple the very system of the Islamic Republic.

Even the 1979 revolutionary movement was extremely diverse and it was composed of nationalists, liberals, leftist sympathizers and Shiite clerics, but they all joined under Khomeini’s leadership. According to some, the Green Movement stands out for being a horizontal movement and not a hierarchical one, as it has multiple centers of command. According to others, it simply lacks a true leader, who must come to the fore if this movement of the people wishes to reach its goals.

However, there are also other differences between 1979 and the current situation: the Shah’s army cannot be compared at all to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the backbone of today’s regime; the Shah’s regime had been imposed by foreign powers (the U.S. and Great Britain), while today’s regime is entirely Iranian; moreover, the core of today’s protest movement is made up of the youth and student movement in a country in which about 60% of the population is below 30 years of age and the number of graduates and university students has grown tremendously thanks to the Islamic Republic, which has made spreading education one of its main priorities.

Another issue heavily debated among experts in Iranian affairs regards the actual composition of the protest movement. According to some, it is still limited to the better-off groups of the population, the wealthy families living in the northern part of Tehran, the intellectual elite and to well-educated young people open to the modern world. However, others underscore that the discontent is actually more across-the-board and widespread throughout the country and that the missteps of the Iranian government since the June-12th elections have progressively eroded its legitimation in the eyes of wider portions of the population. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that on the occasion of the Ashura protests, the rallies, which had been limited to Teheran and a few other large cities, spread for the first time to smaller towns where the regime’s control is much more widespread and where it is much more difficult for opposition leaders to act without being identified.

One thing that clearly arises from these often diverging and contrasting analyses is that no one is actually able to foresee where this crisis will lead. There are too many unpredictable factors both internally and internationally.

The Iranian internal political scenario seems to be extremely fragmented. There are divisions among the clerics. There are contrasts between a part of the clergy and the system of power centered on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is not a monolithic block either. Even the conservatives supporting Ahmadinejad and rallying around the supreme leader Ali Khamenei risk isolating themselves from the rest of the country with their uncompromising positions. However, they are the ones who are currently wielding power.

The Green Movement’s leadership is faithful to the principles of the Islamic Republic and it might fear the movement’s more extremist wings. Undoubtedly, according to this leadership, a gradual reform of the system is preferable, thus allowing it to include more democratic principles, greater freedoms and a greater respect for human rights. In recent days there have been rumors of possible “behind-the-scene negotiations” between reformists like former president Mohammad Khatami and Mir Hossein Moussavi, on the one hand, and the government, on the other. However, these efforts have clashed with the regime’s rigidity in rejecting all of the opposition’s requests.

Rafsanjani – a pragmatic figure and one of the pillars of the Islamic Republic right from its foundation – has recently called once again for dialogue and reconciliation, but he too is becoming increasingly isolated and accused more and more openly by the establishment’s hardliners of being a traitor. Posed before the regime’s insurmountable wall, it is likely that those opposition figures who are more open to reconciliation and dialogue will be progressively pushed into a position of political irrelevance both with regard to the government and within the very Green Movement. If it were to become blatant that it is impossible to reform the system from the inside, this might contribute to molding the opposition’s still unclear identity along lines which risk leading it to an all-out clash with the regime. In this case, according to some, the outcome would be a civil war rather than a revolution.

In this scenario a decisive role is played by the tenets of Iranian Shiite culture. The opposition is trying to gain consensus by using Shiite rhetoric in staking its claims. It claims that it embodies the very principles of Shia Islam and the Islamic Republic. The regime is trying to portray the Green Movement as an anti-Islamic movement threatening the very foundation of the Shiite Islamic Republic. The outcome of this battle will be decisive in gaining consensus in the country. However, above all, it risks creating an unbridgeable rift between the government and opposition and hence between the masses supporting one or the other.

If the clash takes place between conservatives and reformists in a shared system, any divergences can be settled within the system. However, if the ones opposing the government are accused of being ‘mohareb’, enemies of God (and hence the Islamic Republic) – this was the charge that led to the hanging of two young men last week – the confrontation can become an all-out clash between those accused of wanting to overthrow the Islamic Republic – i.e., the opposition – and those accused of having betrayed the very principles of the Republic by imposing a despotic rule – i.e., the government.

In such a tense and delicate situation, international factors may heavily affect Iran’s internal situation. In a country in which the regime continually accuses the opposition of being at the service of foreign powers, any form of external interference is clearly a boomerang for the protest movement. Many leaders of the Green Movement have repeatedly stated that they are not affiliated with foreign powers and that they do not want their support. All they are willing to accept and actually call for on the part of the West is to publicly condemn the serious violations of human rights committed by the Iranian government.

Many Iranian observers have stated that any external threats – such as sanctions or even a military intervention to stop the Iranian nuclear program – would bolster the regime and weaken the opposition.

According to some, the regime is perfectly aware of this and is aiming at regrouping the internal front by shifting the country’s attention to foreign policy issues. This appears to be the key to understanding the statements made by Khamenei on the very day when the entire world was commemorating the Holocaust. On January 27th he stated that “there will be a day when the countries of the region will see the destruction of the Zionist regime”.

These statements – which are absolutely condemnable per se – seem to be his way of playing into hands of those who, in the light of Iran’s alleged nuclear threat, wish to further isolate Iran with new sanctions and hence open the way to a possible military solution.

Several members of Iran’s opposition have stated that a military attack would mark the end of the Green Movement, and that sanctions would hit the Iranian people heavily damaging the country’s opposition.

The “Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act” approved by the US Senate last week seems to be heading though in this very direction. Although, in principle, its objective is to hit the economic interests of the  Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, it is actually hitting Iran’s energy sector and hence its people who will have to cope with sharp rises in fuel prices and major difficulties in the transportation sector.

In addition to the law approved by the US Senate and the threat of other international sanctions, the Obama Administration decided over the weekend to deploy US-manufactured antimissile systems in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait and the message that Washington is sending to Tehran is all too clear: it marks the end of any attempt at starting a dialogue and a drastic shift towards the logic of confrontation.

According to US intelligence analyses, if Iran really aims at building a nuclear weapon, it is not a matter of months, but rather of a few years before it can actually reach its goal. As some have pointed out, there is enough time to pursue a diplomatic solution and allow the developments in Iranian internal affairs to yield their fruit.

The victory of the hardline at an international level, with new sanctions and the threat of military action, risks undermining the Iranian opposition and favoring hardliners in Tehran leading the regime to tighten its authoritarian grip on the country.

The resulting scenario would be a clash between the “Western hardline” and the “Iranian hardline”, which risks breaking out in a military conflict and – considering the aggressive bent of those who will have reached unchallenged political power in Teheran by then – seeing the involvement not only of Iran, but also of many hot spots in the Middle East over which Tehran has leverage: from Lebanon to Palestine, from Iraq to Yemen.