The first half of 2009 was relatively quiet in Iraq. The main events were the January provincial elections, the withdrawal of US troops from Iraqi cities at the end of June, and a substantial drop in violence throughout the country.

The provincial elections marked a setback for the more openly sectarian parties and saw the victory of the State of Law Coalition, the new list led by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki who aimed to establish a national political movement without sectarian undertones. These elections also saw the Sunnis accept the political process underway after they had boycotted the 2005 elections en masse.

This had led some to believe that Iraq was on the way to the normalization of political life, leaving behind the darkest years of sectarian confrontation and civil war.

However, none of the deeper reasons behind the Iraqi crisis – the Kurdish Question, reconciliation between Sunnis and Shiites, federalism, the distribution of the country’s resources, foreign interference – have been adequately addressed over the past year.

As it could be easily expected, the approaching parliamentary elections, initially scheduled to be held in January 2010, have led to a recrudescence in the country’s latent conflicts, first with extenuating negotiations on the new electoral law, which, among other things, has led to the postponement of the elections to March 7th, and then with the announcement in mid-January of the exclusion of over 500 candidates from electoral lists following the so-called “debaathification” campaign.

The goal of this campaign was to “cleanse” the Iraqi political scene of all those who were tainted by links to Saddam Hussein’s regime, but these measures have mostly hit Sunni politicians (often with remote links to the Baath Party), and particularly members of the Iraqi National Movement, also known as al-Iraqiya, led by former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi.

This situation has led to a major political crisis leading to the heightening of tension between Sunnis and Shiites. The decisions made by the “Accountability and Justice Commission”, set up to cleanse the electoral lists of people linked to Saddam’s Baath Party, have led many to believe that its real objective is to get rid of opponents potentially dangerous for the current parties in power during the coming elections.

The crisis caused by “debaathification” is partly the consequence of the major upheavals on the Iraqi political scene in the course of 2009, which have changed the face of Iraq’s political parties on the eve of the March 7th elections compared to those of the 2005 elections.

The United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), the Shiite coalition that won the elections in 2005 and supported the following Shiite-led governments, no longer exists. Its dissolution dates back to even before the January 2009 provincial elections and it has marked a split among Shiites. The new coalition called Iraqi National Alliance (INA) brings together more openly sectarian Shiite parties like the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC) led by Ammar al-Hakim (son of the late Abdul Aziz), Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement, the Fadhila Party, and others, but it does not comprise the members of the Da’wa Party still faithful to Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who has founded a new list, the State of Law Coalition, in the hope of giving it a more national and less sectarian scope.

The INA coalition is not only downsized compared to the UIA, but even more fragile due to the mutual distrust of the Sadrist movement and the SIIC. In turn, al-Maliki, after breaking away from the Shiite parties currently belonging to the INA, is trying to shape his State of Law Coalition as a lay movement and draw Sunni and Kurdish figures to join it. However, it seems that his efforts have failed and the recent debaathification campaign he supported has stained his credibility as a political figure above all sectarian contrasts.

The real novelty on the Iraqi political scene is the birth of the Iraqi National Movement (INM), the coalition led by former prime minister Iyad Allawi (a lay Shiite) comprising several Sunni movements and aiming to be a more credible national movement. The INM is the most dangerous opponent for the INA and al-Maliki’s list, and it has been the most heavily hit by the debaathification campaign.

The Sunnis who boycotted en masse the 2005 elections seem to be set this time on participating in the elections, as they have realized that they made a big mistake at the previous elections when their boycott actually cut them out of the decision-making process in the following years. Sunni political groups can be found in the INM, but also in independent lists.

The political scenario is completed by the Kurdish parties, which, unlike other groups, have not made any effort to set up multi-ethnic and multisectarian alliances focusing primarily on their Kurdish identity. However, even the Kurdish political scene has changed. The two historical parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which had already run together in a joint coalition during the 2005 elections, have been joined by the Movement for Change (Gorran), a PUK breakaway movement that did very well during the elections held in the autonomous region of Kurdistan last July.

If Gorran should confirm, on March 7th, the good results achieved during the Kurdistan provincial elections, some Kurds fear that this will weaken the Kurdish position in Baghdad, since Gorran does not belong to the coalition with PUK and KDP. Nonetheless, it is widespread opinion that the Kurds will continue to be decisive for the creation of a new executive after elections, because each list competing for the relative majority (INA, State of Law Coalition and INM) will inevitably have to establish alliances to form a new government.

The Iraqi political scene appears to be extremely complex and fragmented and no longer divided simply along ethnic and sectarian lines. The debaathification campaign has definitely foiled all hopes of national reconciliation, but the confrontation no longer seems to be just between Shiites and Sunnis, but rather between the supporters of a united and centralized Iraq and those of a federal or confederated State, between the supporters of a lay approach and those of a religious approach, and finally between currents in favor of the US plan (or at least set on taking advantage of it) and those in favor of Iranian influence.

Given Iraq’s geopolitical and strategic importance in the Middle East, Teheran and Washington have both been aiming to control the country ever since the US invasion in 2003. During the Bush era, Iran had tried to bog down the U.S. in Iraq to prevent a direct attack on Iran. As the Iran nuclear crisis has worsened and the Obama administration has progressively moved to more uncompromising positions, Teheran is leveraging once again the Iraqi option to avoid a direct clash with Washington.

Not only the U.S., but also many in the Arab world, have accused Iran of being the true force behind debaathification whose ultimate goal is to create a pro-Iranian sectarian regime. Iranian President Ahmadinejad has personally replied to these allegations, accusing Washington of wanting to bring the Baathists back to power in Iraq.

His accusations refer to talks in recent months held by US representatives (starting from Vice President Joe Biden) in Iraq to favor reconciliation in the country and integrate the Sunnis in the political process. It should not be forgotten that debaathification was actually launched by the U.S. after the invasion of Iraq. Only later on did Washington change its strategy when it realized that leaving out the Sunnis risked playing the country into the hands of Iran.

The U.S. is currently in the middle of an effort to disengage for Iraq and bring troops home. However, this is possible only if it will leave a stable Iraq possibly free from Iran’s grip. The worsening of tension in Iraq and the – often contrasting – interests that many bordering countries – not just Iran – have in the country leave very little hope for Iraq’s stability.

In the event of a new worsening in the political and security situation of Iraq, it is also possible that the U.S. will go ahead with its disengagement policy. US ambassador to Iraq, Christopher Hill, has clearly stated that Washington’s interests in the country are long-term interests, which will not be downsized by the withdrawal of US troops.

Due to the regional power play going on around Iraq, it seems as if the Iraqi elections are drawing greater attention abroad than in Iraq. The main Iraqi political forces are heavily funded by foreign powers. Besides the U.S. and Iran, financial support and more is being provided by Persian Gulf States like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and indirect support is coming from countries like Syria.

While corruption is widespread and episodes of vote selling are becoming more and more frequent, Iraqi citizens are losing hope and becoming increasingly disappointed with the “democracy” of the new Iraq. They still live in a situation of severe insecurity, without almost any services and exposed to growing poverty. Voter turnout is expected to be low. Some Iraqi officials have stated that a turnout of 50% would already be a success.

Unemployment in the country is rampant, health care is minimal and Iraq is literally dying of thirst. Drought has hit large areas of the country forcing the government to increase spending on food imports, while the two main rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, are almost dry because of the reckless policies of bordering countries (mainly Turkey, but even Syria and Iran) which have built several dams upstream of the two rivers and their tributaries.

In the light of as much, the outcome of the elections will probably be decided by external factors rather than being the expression of the vote of Iraqi citizens. This outcome will risk having almost no impact on the real problems affecting the country and its people.

While the risk feared by some that Iraq may become a pro-Iranian regime seems overblown, it is possible that the country will become increasingly fragmented and unstable especially if the confrontation between Teheran and Washington were to reach new heights. The Iraqi political scene would risk witnessing growing “Lebanonization”, namely heading for a progressive paralysis as a result of rivalries and vetos among the various factions, as was the case in Lebanon.

Considering all this, an even greater challenge compared to peaceful and fair elections will be the creation of a new government, which risks embroiling Iraq’s political forces for months. And a long political stalemate also risks leading to the outbreak of more violence.