U.S. and Western troops will stay in Afghanistan until 2014 when Afghan forces will take full control over security in the country: this is the final decision of the international conference held in Kabul on Tuesday, July 20th.

The emphasis placed on the 2014 deadline aims, in the opinion of many, at ignoring the previous 2011 deadline set by U.S. President Barack Obama for the withdrawal of American troops from the country, which was deemed by many as a declaration of surrender to the Taliban.

The new policy stresses that withdrawal from Afghanistan will be very gradual and based on the actual situation on the ground, so any deadlines set must be considered as merely indicative.

However, this is the whole core of the issue: the actual situation on the ground, which made a rapid withdrawal starting from 2011 rather unlikely considering the set objectives, is already making a total pull-out from Afghanistan by 2014 just as unlikely (unless it becomes suddenly necessary due to precipitating events, namely because the Taliban are sweeping through the country leading to an imminent rout).

Therefore, the tragic Afghan saga is bound to continue, at least in the near future, and NATO’s commitment may be extended against all logic and despite the total lack of tangible results.

The most striking aspect of the recent Kabul conference was the huge divide between the rhetoric of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and what is actually happening on the ground in the war in Afghanistan.

In an article published the day after the conference, Rasmussen defined the meeting a “milestone” in the process by which the Afghans will take over their fates.

“Afghanistan is finally moving in the right direction”, wrote Rasmussen. “Maybe the insurgents think they can wait us out, but we will stay for as long as it takes to finish our job”.

While Rasmussen was writing these words, it was already widely known to international observers that 2009 marked the year when the Taliban launched the largest number of attacks over the past eight years, and that 2010 is bound to be even more violent and lethal for the troops of the Western coalition.

While most of Afghanistan is still under Taliban control, NATO’s military offensives that Rasmussen defines to be “of tremendous political importance” because “they contribute to the marginalization of the Taliban as a political and military force,” have turned out to be a failure: the troops of the Western coalition and those of the Afghan army are meeting enormous difficulties in defending themselves against massive Taliban counterattacks and the Afghan government has failed to ensure any services for the “freed” population.

Many of the objectives announced at the Kabul conference, such as giving the Afghan government greater administrative responsibilities in exchange for greater transparency and efficiency on its behalf, had already been set forth on the occasion of previous conferences like those held in London in 2006 and Paris in 2008. However, over the years, the situation has actually worsened.

According to a recent report, the amount of bribes and kickbacks paid in Afghanistan doubled between 2006 and 2009. Corruption is widespread. Hundreds of millions of dollars have ended up in the pockets of contractors, corrupt officials and warlords because of the lack of effective control mechanisms.

State institutions are still weak. The State is absent. In 2008, namely after seven years of “nation-building” in Afghanistan, a Brookings Institution report stated that the country ranked second to last in the world for the solidity of its State institutions followed only by Somalia.

Afghan armed forces and police are supposed to take over control in 2014, but their level of training is discouraging. A recent SIGAR (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction) report states that only 23% of the Afghan army and just 12% of Afghan police can carry out operations independently.

There have been many cases in which the Afghan police has committed abuses against the local population instead of protecting it. The Daily Telegraph has reported alarming incidents of young Afghan soldiers shooting their guns or even rocket launchers by mistake.

Afghan soldiers are poorly paid and ill-equipped. They often take the weapons of their comrades killed in action. However, though their level of training is scarce compared to that of American troops, they are often sent on dangerous patrolling missions at night. Considering the living and working conditions they are forced to face, it happens that some of them pass over to the Taliban.

It is clear that in 2014 the targets set by the Kabul conference might still appear to be as remote as they are today.

Several commentators have defined the conference’s climate as “unreal” or even “surreal”: while some spoke of a victory “so close” that the issue of the transfer of powers to the Afghan government could be discussed, the rebels succeeded in launching at least five rockets near the airport and the diplomatic zone. Earlier, the route of the plane carrying the UN Secretary General had to be suddenly changed to avoid the risk that it could be hit by the Taliban.

In the meantime, it is even clear that starting from next year Western disengagement might actually start. It will be increasingly difficult for Western governments to give public opinion in their countries good reasons to extend the war effort after almost a decade of fighting and huge costs in terms of public expenditure and the toll in human lives.

Recent opinion polls show that 77% of public opinion in Great Britain is in favor of withdrawing troops within the next 12 months. In the United States, in May, 52% of Americans believed that it was not worthwhile to continue fighting the Afghan war.

The idea that this war is necessary to fight terrorism is no longer sustainable. Al-Qaeda, which was held responsible for the 9/11 attacks in 2001, no longer exists. Its centralized organization has been broken into a series of branches that have few mutual links and are scattered in countries like Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, rather than Afghanistan. They often have ties to local movements or operate through individuals recruited over the Internet (as was the case of the young Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and his failed attack on board the flight to Detroit).

In order to fight this type of terrorism, the war in Afghanistan makes no sense at all.

The instability that is likely to arise from a sudden pull-out of Western troops from Afghanistan is much more dangerous, as the country would fall back under the control of the Taliban or be torn by a new civil war.

However, in order to avoid this risk, the only possible road is that of a regional agreement ensuring the country’s stability. The Obama administration has not been able to or not wanted to take this path. For instance, it seems to have ignored Russia’s appeal to make Afghanistan a “neutral” country, which – without any form of permanent foreign military presence on its soil – can serve to stabilize the region, laying the foundations for good neighbor and cooperation relations throughout the region.

Although it does realize that it must downsize its military presence in Afghanistan, Washington does not seem to be willing to give up its influence in the country. In a recent press conference, Pres. Obama stated that the United States “will remain a long-term partner for the security and progress of the Afghan people”.

This concept was made all the more clearer by NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, when he stated that NATO should develop a long-term cooperation agreement with the Afghan government, a sort of “status of forces agreement” like the one reached by U.S. forces with the Maliki government in Iraq.

If, in addition to these statements, you consider that the United States is building a $100-million base for its special forces near Mazar-i Sharif, just a dozen kilometers away from the Uzbek border, it is obvious that the 2014 deadline does not imply a total disengagement of the United States (or NATO) from Afghanistan.

The Pentagon also plans on building military training camps in central Asian countries bordering with Afghanistan, like unstable Kyrgyzstan (where the United State already has the Manas air force base, which is of strategic importance for the Afghan war), Tajikistan and Kazakhstan.

According to many observers, Washington’s plan to keep a foothold in Afghanistan has much more to do with central Asia as a whole, which lies near the Russian border and turbulent Chinese border in Xinjiang – but it is even next to Iran and another strategic country like Pakistan – rather than with the need to fight terrorism or promote democracy in Afghanistan.

Then there is the issue of stabilizing the country. The United States has not succeeded with military force and it does not seem to be willing to reach it through a regional agreement. The path Washington is trying to pursue at the moment is that of reaching an agreement with the Taliban (or at least a part of them) – thanks also to Pakistan’s support – for a power-sharing arrangement in Kabul.

However, as many analysts have noted, this tactic risks intensifying regional tensions, rather than quenching them. First of all, the Taliban will possibly not accept any agreement, because they are convinced that they are about to win the war. Then, a return of the Taliban to Kabul would raise concern in India (and even Iran) because it would mean that Pakistan would gain the upper hand in Afghanistan.

This is the reason why Washington wants Islamabad, though supporting an agreement between Karzai and the Afghan Taliban, to fight the Taliban from the rear in the Pakistani region of Northern Waziristan. However, the Taliban, rooted especially among the Pashtun on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border, ensure Pakistan “strategic depth” inside Afghanistan. On the one hand, they are Islamabad’s guarantee to oppose Indian influence in Kabul; on the other, the Pakistani army would never heavily engage military forces on its northwestern border exposing its back to its enemy India to the southeast (in recent days efforts to resume talks between Islamabad and New Delhi have failed).

Then there is Iran, which, after Pakistan, is the country with most influence in Afghanistan. Teheran is exerting its influence especially over the country’s Shiites and non-Pashtun minorities. Iran, on the one hand, is poised as an interlocutor of the Afghan government; on the other, it has not hesitated to support its Taliban “enemies” (Teheran’s opponents because they are an expression of Salafist Sunni Islam sponsored by Iran’s age-old enemy, Saudi Arabia) to the extent in which they are a thorn in the United States’ side.

Teheran’s objectives include consolidating its bargaining position with Washington. However, if Afghanistan were to fall into the hands of the Taliban, Teheran would lose its influence in the country to Pakistan’s benefit. For this reason, Teheran may side with India (as was already the case of the Soviet pull-out in 1989) to support non-Pashtun Afghan minorities against the Taliban.

These fleeting observations clearly show that Washington’s game is very dangerous. Betting on reaching an agreement with the Taliban that does not lead to a crushing victory for them and Pakistan, is rather absurd. At the same time, though, the United States does not seem to be able to control the many opposing influences and forces that a change in the status quo would unleash in the country.